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THE FAR EAST

NATIONALIST
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or CHRISTIAN

STANLEY HIGH

Published by
FOREIGN MISSIONS CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA
419 FOURTH AVENUE NEW YORK CITY
Price 10 Cents

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BY

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419 Fourth Avenue, New York City

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

ONE DAY, while the Shanghai fight was at its hottest, a friend offered me a patent solution for "this whole Far Eastern mess".

"The President of the United States", he said, "ought to order our missionaries to shut up shop and our traders to pack their samples and the whole of them to climb aboard the nearest boat and head for home. That would leave a clear field and no favors for the Orientals. They could cut each others' throats to their hearts' content. If we keep our finger in that pie we'll get it burned—or amputated. Besides, what's a war in China got to do with the price of wheat?"

And that, I should say, pretty well sums up the most commonly held American opinion on this question. It is an opinion that would be common in regard to almost any question that was being settled six thousand miles away. There are too many more pressing matters nearby —the price of wheat, for example. The newspapers for several weeks did spread Shanghai across the front page. But that was chiefly because a good fight is a good story regardless of who's fighting or why. A large number of interested groups—peace advocates, on the one hand, and militarists, on the other—suffered a considerable, if temporary, agitation. There were a few days during which American opinion seemed ready to go a bit feverish. But those few days passed and, with them, the symptoms. The high priced war correspondents have long since been recalled. The war itself has long since disappeared from the front page. And the country, undisturbed by what did or what may happen, has returned to the ticker tape, the price of wheat and hogs.

Now it is not my purpose to belittle this preoccupation with bread-and-butter matters. They are serious enough. In fact, it is partly because of their seriousness that this pamphlet is being written. For the facts seem to indicate that the world will never be safe for prosperity—and for a good many other more important things—until certain issues now being fought out in the Far East are settled. The China war may not affect the sale of this year's crops. But what's back of the China war is almost sure to affect the sale of *some* year's crops and to continue, increasingly, to affect it until the problems involved have been solved.

That, of course, puts the argument on the lowest possible level. I think it will be made plain that much more than economic matters are at stake in the Far East. From the historical point of view, purely economic forces seldom, if ever, settle anything right or with permanent safety. Nevertheless, there are many Americans nowadays, who, like my friend, are in a "price of wheat" frame of mind. They are likely to become internationalists on the day that they discover that internationalism pays—and not before. For their benefit it needs to be said

at the very beginning that, in the case of Eastern Asia, internationalism, sooner or later, is bound to pay. The paying process may not be pleasant. And the coin may be unwelcome. But there will be a day of reckoning and we will be involved in it. If we choose to disregard that fact, our children will not be able to escape its consequences. What's stirring today in the Far East is almost sure to produce results, which, tomorrow, will stand among the major assets or liabilities of our civilization.

The story of the Far Eastern crisis is generally told in terms of conflicting national interests. But that is only part of the story—perhaps the lesser part. Eastern Asia is torn by more than the competitive claims of China, Japan and Russia. Purely national interests, crucial as they may be for the moment, provide a facade behind which more significant forces are at work. These forces are not national. They are international. Their strategists speak not one but many languages. No single flag holds their allegiance. They have come into conflict in the Far East. But they will not be confined there. The Far East, in fact, provides only the arena for the current rounds of what is certain to be a long fight and which may end up by becoming a free-for-all, with the world involved.

Toyohiko Kagawa has pointed out that the situation in the Far East is a race between communism and Christianity. He would probably agree that what began as a race has become a conflict. And he would also, doubtless, recognize that there are two other entries in it which he did not name: nationalism and militarism. Everything that has happened or may happen cannot, of course, be explained exclusively in terms of one or another of these movements. But nothing of significance that has happened or is likely to happen can be entirely explained without them. Moreover, merely to name them is to indicate the more than oriental significance of the struggle in which they are involved. If they were not localized before this conflict, they will certainly not be localized during it. Not when the stakes involve the domination of a quarter of the human race.

Finally, no serious appraisal of the fundamentals of the Far Eastern situation can fail to take into special account the peculiar status and significance of Christianity. Eastern Asia, at present, is suffering from a too intense application of certain Western importations. The militarism of Japan is built after a Prussian model. The new nationalism of China has found its slogans and objectives in the Occident. Communism, now driving for mastery in the East, came out of the West. Without attempting to analyze these forces, it can be said that, in the light of today's tendencies and prospects, both communism and militarism are, and nationalism may become, the instruments of major world trouble. And the most important history of the next century—not for the Far East, only, but for the world—will very likely be shaped for good or ill by the extent to which the animosities engendered by

these forces are tempered with understanding and their aggressiveness modified by a spirit of conciliation.

That, in brief, is why it becomes now a fact of critical importance that while the Far East was importing certain dubious values from the West, it also imported Christianity. Any forecast of the possibilities in Eastern Asia that leaves Christianity out of account can lead only to the most ominous conclusions. For in this whole vast area peace and good-will and international righteousness have no indigenous sponsorship which, in terms of sacrificial loyalty, is comparable to that of the organized Christian faith.

I

TODAY'S Far Eastern situation, of course, did not just happen. It has been for many years in the making. And it is impossible to understand the cabled accounts of what is happening at present or what is due to happen in the near future without some knowledge of the way in which current developments have been, through this longer period, in preparation. It is a lack of this knowledge, in fact, that accounts for most of the many off-balance judgments that have been passed on recent Far Eastern events.

This, I think, is particularly apparent in the case of Japan. A knowledge of the history of modern Japan does not exonerate the militarists of that nation. But it does explain them. And the explanation is of a sort to indicate that their influence cannot be lessened or their activities curbed by the simple expedient of wholesale condemnation.

It was, ostensibly, an innocuous, routine mission on which Commodore Perry embarked when he sailed for Japan early in 1853. But on July 7, two American steam frigates and two sloops of war entered the Bay of Uraga and the Shoguns, presented with President Fillmore's letter asking "friendship and commerce", took counsel together and with the feudatory princes, appraised the weakened defenses of the Empire, learned of the approach of a Russian war-vessel and of the proximity of a French frigate and, in the end, capitulated. National isolation, scrupulously maintained since Iyemitsu's edict in 1639, came to an abrupt end.

It is not strange that the Japanese under this and subsequent coercion took seriously to the business of getting a modern education. And it's not strange that the thing that they learned first of all was the potency of the rod. Moreover, Japan's manner of life being in process of westernization, it was inevitable that her ambitions should be westernized also. It was apparent—the West saw to that—that an "enlightened patriotism", with military power, had much to offer, but without military power, very little. Her newly budded ambitions, to be sure, were confronted with some difficulties—chiefly due to the fact that, while Japan still slept the rest of the nations had been toiling, if not upward,

at least outward through the night. Seven-eighths of the earth's territory was already pretty well preempted by the imperialisms of the West. The little that remained was being aggressively scrambled for. Japan was the one entirely independent nation in all of Asia and Africa. If history and precedent proved anything, they proved to the Japanese that that independence could be maintained only by force of arms and that any extension of authority could only be accomplished by the same means and, probably, in conflict with already established powers.

It needs to be pointed out here that other Westerners, not all of them militarists, came in on the heels of Japan's first foreign counsellors. Five years after Perry's guns had pried apart the nation's doors (1854-1859), certain spokesmen for Christianity had established themselves in Nagasaki. The increasingly ambitious militarists rightly regarded this new religion as a threat to their plans. It was, in fact, pointed out to these early missionaries that "the Mikado's government is based on the Shinto creed, and for its perpetuity depends upon the maintenance of that faith at all hazards. They foresaw in the propagation of Christianity the overthrow of this faith and the consequent fall of the Mikado's dynasty".[1] The fear of Christianity's threat to the Mikado's authority eventually was dispelled. The fear of the threat to the program of the ultra-militarists has never been dispelled. And in the recent crisis, as we shall see, it has had repeated and dramatic confirmation.

It was not because of the innate chauvinism of the Japanese people themselves, but rather because of the soundness of their observations of the rest of the world that they were led to place such great reliance, in this early period, upon the importance of modern military methods. And it soon became apparent that that trust was not misplaced. Japan was ready, by the last decade of the last century, to give the world a demonstration of her right to a place in the sun. On August 1, 1894, war was declared between China and Japan, and contrary to what had been confidently expected the Japanese made short shrift of the Chinese forces.

But the Powers were far from satisfied by the unexpected precociousness of their pupil. Here was a new force, whose sudden emergence was likely to upset the international applecart. Something, obviously, had to be done. Something was done—and in the good old manner. Russia, Germany, and France served an ultimatum on the Japanese, demanding that in the interests of the territorial integrity of China and Korea (strange words from such sources), the Liaotung Peninsula, ceded to terms of the peace treaty, be returned to China. Jointly with this ultimatum—which allowed the Japanese fifteen days to think it over—the above mentioned Powers ordered steam-up in all their Far Eastern fighting craft and headed them toward Japan.

Since it was again a case of gunboats, the Japanese capitulated.

[1] Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, footnote, 565-6.

But the nation was in a frenzy of chagrin and anger. An appalling number of Japanese, humiliated by this "disgrace", committed suicide leaving behind a charge to their fellow subjects to right this wrong with their blood. If there had been any doubt that they would do just that, it was removed when, thirty-six months after the Powers had "saved" the Liaotung Peninsula for the Chinese, Russia rode in on the high tide of Czarist ambition and appropriated, without arousing so much as a protest, that very territory. The reaction on the mind of Japan was the only natural one. Japan was out to do business with the world—but she had fared badly because she was badly supplied with the currency by which nations brought their transactions to a successful conclusion. Superior military force had won the war with China. Superior military force had robbed Japan of the first fruits of that war. The Japanese had learned their second lesson in current internationalism. The first indicated the advisability of a strong army and navy. The second indicated the absolute necessity for a stronger army and navy. And this, in part with indemnity funds paid by the Chinese, the nation proceeded to get. How well she succeeded was made clear to the world in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-5.

Now, this national confidence in military force was more deeply seated among the Japanese and led to a more intense loyalty to the military than was the case in many Western nations. This was due, not to the fact that the Japanese themselves were necessarily more of a military mind, but rather to the fact that the necessity for and the fruitage of militarism were more significantly apparent in Japan than in many other nations. The imperialism of the West was a gradual development. The status of Western nations as Great Powers had been established through centuries. The imperialism of modern Japan, on the other hand, had appeared and proved itself within the memory of the generation that fought the war with Russia. The direct relation between increasing military strength and this phenomenal rise to power was apparent. No Japanese could have doubts about the efficacy of militarism without having doubts about the significance of his nation. Patriotism was a religion in Japan: personified in the person of the Emperor and symbolized in ten thousand temples and wayside shrines. And the army and the navy, to many, if not most Japanese were religion in action.

But the army and the navy were not only the expression of religion in action. They became the guarantors of the nation's bread and butter, or, more accurately, of its rice and fish. There are better reasons than a desire for a place in the sun, to account for Japan's expansive policies. During the long period of the Tokugawa Shogunate, that preceded the opening of Japan, the population of the country was maintained at between twenty-five and thirty millions. Today her population is nearing seventy millions, and increasing now about 850,000 every year.[2]

[2] *Japan Year Book.*

This population is crowded into a territory less in extent than the state of Montana. And of this area, only between fifteen and sixteen millions of acres are arable—less than two percent of the arable land of the United States, and about equal to that included in the improved farms of the state of New York.[3]

When, at about the time of the war with China in 1894, Japan's population began to increase with such rapidity, the people were confronted with three alternatives: they could migrate, industrialize or starve. Starvation, obviously, was out. Migration presented serious difficulties which through the past thirty years have proved to be insurmountable. Manchuria and Korea, the most likely fields for colonization, have never been looked upon with favor by the Japanese emigrant. Out of Manchuria's total population of 30,000,000, only slightly more than 200,000 are Japanese. This is due, in part, to the cold climate, to the more extensive type of land cultivation that is required in these areas and to the severe competition of Korean and Chinese farmers. The climate of California was hospitable but the people were not. Some small migration has taken place into Lower California, Mexico and certain South American nations. But the numbers involved were too small to relieve the seriousness of the problem at home.

There remained, then, the alternative of industrialization. But this was a choice easier made than executed. Those three fundamentals of modern industry—coal, iron and oil—were lacking in Japan. Of these three, the greatest lack was iron. At present the total iron reserves of Japan are only slightly more than the iron production of the United States in a single year.[4] Her oil production is less, by more than one half, than her requirements.

Obviously, then, the expansion which could not have been justified on the ground of mere imperialistic ambition and would have been useless for purposes of colonization was, and in the opinion of many Japanese still is, both justifiable and necessary on the ground of economic survival. It was inevitable in Japan, as it has almost always been in the West, to look to the military as the agency of this expansion and just as inevitable to look to the Asiatic mainland and, specifically, to Manchuria, as the most likely territory in which to expand.

This expansion, begun at the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, has been accompanied with all the nationalistic fervor customarily worked up over imperialistic adventurings. But, as I have indicated, there are economic reasons for this emotionalism, both in the economic shortages of Japan and in the economic surplusages of Manchuria. Control of the raw materials of this area, with little question, is of as great importance to Japan as is the control of India to the British or of Morocco to the French.

[3] Bruere, *Harpers Magazine*, March, 1932.
[4] See *The Stateman's Year Book* and "Japan" in the Encyclopedia Britannica.

In this regard, of course, the militarists have contended from the beginning that political control of Manchuria was necessary to make the economic control secure. Events of the past two decades do not bear out that contention. Japanese capital has steadily poured into the territory. Disturbances there have been, but no major setback or even serious threat to Japan's right to continue the development she had begun. And the business interests, who held the biggest claims in Manchuria, have, themselves, been most outspoken against the military policy of those who have advocated the establishment of political control.

Now in Manchuria, moreover, it was plain from the beginning that the Japanese could accomplish a double killing with a single attack. An area as rich as Manchuria would always be, as for the last half century it always had been, a sore temptation to the Powers. An independent Japan, with any sense of *realpolitik*, could not take the chances involved in the domination of Manchuria by some other power. Russia, by the war in 1905, was pushed out and the Japanese, with the kind of statesmanship that for long has ruled the world, were not and are not now prepared to allow any other nation to move in. A Japanese-dominated Manchuria is, in the opinion of the Japanese, essential to the political security of Japan. A glance at the map of Eastern Asia will indicate the basis for this feeling.

While at the business of making themselves politically secure the Japanese saw that they could, by the cultivation of Manchuria's resources, make themselves, in part at least, economically independent. Here was a territory as great in extent as Germany and France combined and more than twice the size of Japan proper, an area that was rich in the very materials that Japan lacked. There were scarcely touched reservoirs of coal, iron, lead, gold, and silver. With claims to this wealth staked out and adequately guarded the future of Japan's industrial life was sure. And with extensive forests and more extensive farm-lands, a nation, otherwise bound to be stinted and dwarfed, could come to its full stature.

In this respect the war with Russia accomplished what the war with China, a decade before, had failed to do. Under the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan found herself well established in South Manchuria. The "rights" formerly held by Russia in the Liaotung Peninsula, including the two important harbors of Dairen and Port Arthur, were transferred to her. She also moved into Russia's place in the control of the southern part of the Chinese Eastern Railway which runs through the richest areas of Manchuria. And Russia was forced to recognize Japan's claim to a special interest in Korea. Confidence in militarism was once again and more completely vindicated.

Five years after the conclusion of the war with Russia, Japan made the next move on the mainland. This move involved the annexation of

Korea. Another five years passed and in 1915 Japan, still relying on the militarism learned from the West, moved again. China in 1915 was probably in a more helpless condition than at any time in modern history. From a strictly military point of view, doubtless she was no weaker than she had been for some time. But in that year most of the rest of the world was feverishly involved in Western Europe. China, formerly guarded by the jealousies of the West, was left unprotected and unable, as she had customarily done, to play these jealousies against each other for her own safety. And Chinese nationalism was too insignificant to provide even a semblance of security.[5]

The times, in other words, were propitious. Japan, therefore, seized this opportunity to present her Twenty-One Demands. Had these demands been allowed to stand unmodified, Japan would have been able to establish a virtual protectorate over all China, with special authority in Shantung Province and a dominant position over the coal and iron resources of Central China. The Washington Conference, however, eliminated the most offensive clauses, including those relating to China proper. Those which related to Manchuria, however, were allowed to stand.

In brief these Manchurian clauses gave indefinite extension to the "rights" which Japan had taken over from Russia. The "lease" under which Russia had held the Kwantung Leased Territory at the southern tip of Manchuria was due to expire in 1923. Japan, with the Twenty-One Demands, extended that lease for 99 years from the original date, 1898, to 1997. Control of the Antung-Mukden Railway which, as things stood when Japan took over, would have passed to China in 1923 was extended also 99 years, from 1907 to 2007. The original terms relative to the South Manchurian Railway allowed the Chinese to buy control of that line in 1939. This eventuality was postponed, by the treaties of 1915, to the year 2002.

From the juridical point of view, it is the validity of these 1915 agreements which is the point, right now, at issue between Japan and China. Unprejudiced international *opinion* seems to agree that they are valid.[6] But the Chinese have insisted that these treaties were signed under duress, are, therefore, not valid, and, moreover, that they have never received the ratification required by China's Constitution. However it is in the alleged violations of these 1915 treaties by China that Japan has found legal excuse for her recent actions in Manchuria.

Whether or not the excuse can be justified, the fact remains that after 1915 Japan went steadily forward consolidating her Manchurian position. The railway zone, originally a strip of land from fifty to three hundred feet on either side of the tracks of the Japanese controlled

[5] See *Current History*, Feb. 1932, "Japan's Bid for Far Eastern Supremacy" by Wilbur Burton.

[6] See Walter Young's *Manchuria.*

railways, was occupied and extended. Extensive concessions were secured over resources in the territory. And while Japanese authorities maintained peace and order in these special areas nearly a billion dollars of Japanese capital was poured into the country to speed its development.

But, despite these entrenchments, the opinion seemed to gain in Japan that the nation's position in Manchuria was by no means secure. There was real ground for this belief. For one thing, the Chinese population of the country was rapidly on the increase. Each year for the last six years prior to 1931 more than 500,000 Chinese moved from the overcrowded provinces of Chihli and Shantung to permanent homes in Manchuria and 500,000 more poured into the territory, every year, for seasonal employment. Despite the fact that Premier Komura, twenty-five years ago, had predicted that within ten years Japan would settle 1,000,000 Japanese, in this area the total number, exclusive of the military, was only 220,000 in 1931, and of these very few were settled on the land. Obviously, so great a Chinese population, increasing with such rapidity, constituted at least a potential threat to Japan's position.

Moreover, the Chinese were becoming truculent. The spirit of nationalism abroad in the provinces below the Great Wall was reaching into Manchuria to the embarrassment of the Japanese. It was reaching even to the government at Mukden. Now it should be said that China's theoretical right to sovereignty over Manchuria has never been seriously questioned. That sovereignty, in fact, extends back to the 17th century when the Manchus swept into China and set up their dynasty at Peking. But the Japanese, while not denying that Manchuria was technically Chinese territory, have latterly insisted that, for the better protection of Japan's interests, the government there should be in "friendly" hands. Under Marshall Chang Tso-lin Manchuria was virtually independent of China and the Japanese managed without serious difficulty. By 1928, however, Chang began to show signs of serious ambitions on his own account. He undertook, among other things, to build a Chinese railway line, the success of which would have seriously discommoded the Japanese. This threat was ended, however, by the death of Chang, who was killed early in 1928 when his train was wrecked on the South Manchurian Railway.

Chang's son, Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang, succeeded to power and proved at once more difficult to handle than his father. At the outset of his regime he declared his intention of pledging allegiance to the Nationalist government at Nanking. He was properly warned, delayed action for six months and finally defied the Japanese.

These, obviously, were disturbing signs of the times. Manchuria was being drawn into constantly closer cooperation with Nationalist China. The vast Chinese population was being slowly indoctrinated with nationalist ideas. Japan, as a result, was being subjected to increasing irritations and some embarrassment. The Chinese, in open disregard of

Japan's warnings, and apparently in violation of the treaty of 1905, persisted in their plans to build railway lines so located as to compete with the Japanese lines. Japanese goods were discriminated against. Japan's right to lease lands was obstructed by the Chinese. There was continual interference with the expansion of Japanese industries. Sporadic and informal boycotts were frequent. And, to top it all, no effectual steps seemed to be taken by the Chinese to put an end to the constant depredations of roving bands of irregular soldiery. In other words, Japan, having fought two wars to establish herself in Manchuria, found by 1931 that her place there was far from secure and likely to become even less so.[7]

This security the Japanese now believe they have won. Behind the thin and somewhat gaudy facade of the government of Henry Pu-yi—China's Boy Emperor—Japan dominates all of Manchuria from the Siberian border to the Great Wall. Chang Hsueh-liang and his too-Chinese associates have been ousted. Whereas prior to 1931 1800 miles of Manchuria's 3700 miles of railways were Chinese, Japan today controls them all save the Chinese Eastern Railway, which is still under Russian management. North and South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia are now dominated by Japanese-run lines, and their economic life is controlled through the three Japanese ports of Dairen in Manchuria and Fusan and Seishin in Korea. At last, the Japanese believe they can look to Manchuria and breathe easily.

As I indicated at the outset, this background does not exonerate the Japanese militarists. It does, however, help to explain them. It indicates, in part at least, why it is that the emotions of the Japanese people rise so readily to the sight of marching men. For it is by the growth of the army and the navy that modern Japan has come to power and it is by the maintenance of the army and the navy that Japan has been made and believes she can be kept secure. The West, by military strength, took what it wanted years ago. Having all that it wants or can get, Western nations can afford to talk disparagingly about the tactics of acquisition and can concoct new schemes designed to reduce the importance of the agencies that made those tactics successful. For the Japanese the fruits of militarism are of too recent picking to have palled and apparently too easy to be questioned. Until the expansion of 1932, Japan's military caste—who differ from other imperialists chiefly in that they are more recent—were not for a moment ready to admit that they had taken all that they proposed to have. The Manchurian protectorate merely helps to bring the Japanese, in the eyes of her own imperialists, abreast of the rest of the world. And there they propose to stay.

That, at any rate, is the aggressive intention of the Japanese militarist. Unfortunately, the economic and political facts, as I have set them forth,

[7] See *Japan Speaks* by K. K. Kawakami, pp. 60 ff.

do not supply a full or a wholly satisfactory explanation of Japan's actions. There are some indications that the Manchurian and Shanghai ventures were entered upon less to establish Japan's security than to save its militarism.

For despite the popularly acknowledged debt to the military, the peace movement among the Japanese, up to the fall of 1931, was making significant headway. It was increasingly questionable whether the militarists could count much longer upon the delirious support of the public for their adventures. Business in Japan was lining up not against economic expansion, but against economic expansion by force. Baron Shidehara, foreign minister of Japan when the present trouble began, once declared to me that "Japan needs markets and materials. We are finding out that, nowadays, you can't cultivate the former or dig out the latter with bayonets. That's why Japan's business men are anti-militarist". Just how anti-militarist they were held to be by the extreme nationalists was tragically illustrated in the assassination of Baron Takuma Dan, head of the house of Mitsui, the nation's largest industrial and banking firm.

And labor was beginning to line up with big business for peace. The nation's women, recently given a limited franchise, were campaigning for peace. In fact, when the women of the world sent their disarmament petitions to the Geneva Conference in February, 1932, those from Japan had more signatures than any other nation. Similarly, an active peace movement was under way in the universities of the country.

And most ominous of all the signs of the times for the militarists, was the practical dynamic provided to this peace movement by the Christians of Japan. Here was a group that more than made up with devotion what it lacked in numbers. It has been said that Toyohiko Kagawa, alone, is Japan's greatest peace movement. But from the standpoint of the militarists the most significant and threatening thing about Kagawa's leadership was the fact that he dramatized and made articulate a devotion to peace which was shared, increasingly, by the vast majority of Japan's 270,000 Christians. And more important, the Christian point of view was rapidly extending to many influential Japanese who were not formally Christian. This was happening, not only because intelligent Japanese had begun to recognize that the Christian world program was sound sense, but that Christians—with all due allowance for their many shortcomings—actually meant business. In the long bitterness over the American Exclusion Act, leading Japanese noted and frequently commented upon the fact that the Christian church in America and Japan provided practically the only significant and persisting leadership for the just settlement of this dispute. When anti-Japanese sentiments flared out in the United States, it was the Christian church that raised the most effective protests. Incidentally, American interpretations which during the present crisis have asked for a just rather than a hasty judgment of Japan, have been written not by politicians or economists,

or even by professional peace advocates, but rather by Japan missionaries. The militarists, of course, recognize that Japan was in no immediate "danger" of being swept, en masse, into the Christian church. But they did realize that intellectual Japan was in very real danger of being swept to the Christian point of view. By no means all of the peace leadership was Christian. But it was apparent that on this issue the nation's opinion, by progress that was too steady to be denied, was coming to accept the Christian point of view. And that, more than any other one factor, disturbed the militarists. They saw the handwriting on the wall: and to their consternation it was, to a significant extent, Christian handwriting.

As a result, therefore, the militarist outlook was none too encouraging. It looked as though the peace pacts signed and the peace covenants agreed to, during these post-war years, would find back of them before long the force of an irresistible public opinion. And this prospect, coupled with the constant extension of the practice of and the belief in democracy—which the militarists have always opposed—and the increasing pressure of economic necessity upon the military budget, combined to constitute a threat that could not be ignored. The *coup d'etat* in Manchuria, therefore, is regarded by some observers as an act of self-preservation for the militarists. They, being independent of civil authority and answerable for their actions only to the Emperor, assumed that once such a move was made the popular mind could be propagandized into a revival of the old war enthusiasms, the old dominant position of the militarists in the eyes of the nation could be regained and the long cherished militarist dreams of a day of domination on the mainland might be hastened toward realization. There are even some Japanese spokesmen who are convinced that this, rather than any question of Chinese unrest or economic and political insecurity, dictated the advance into Manchuria which began in September, 1931.[8]

And this conviction is borne out by the more recent movement, among the extreme nationalists, to overthrow constitutional government in Japan and set up, in its place, a Fascist regime. A plot with this as its aim was uncovered among certain young army officers in October, 1931. Although the police revealed the leadership of this movement, the army officers involved were so powerful that subsequent direction of affairs in Manchuria and at Shanghai was very largely in their hands. It was the influence of these extremists that made it possible for the army to take action, in both fields, in complete contradiction to the pledges made by the Japanese War Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was likewise at least indirectly because of the activities and power of the Fascist extremists that Premier Hamaguchi was assassinated in the fall of 1931 and, Baron Takuma Dan, head of Mitsui's, the largest Japanese banking house, and Finance Minister Inouye, early in

[8] See, particularly, the article by Kurataro Hirosa, in the *Christian Century*, April 20, 1932.

1932. These killings were said to be part of a plan to assassinate all of the nation's outstanding moderate leaders, and were regarded by the extremists as a necessary preliminary for the abolition of constitutional government.

The Fascist movement is not wholly inside the army. Fascist ranks have been swelled by large numbers of civilian patriots and have brought together many of the nation's unemployed students. The Fascist program, in so far as it has been outlined, calls for a dictatorship, supplanting in authority the present Parliament. It looks to the elimination of the moderating influence of business upon the government and the suppression, in so far as possible, of the peace movement, and probably also toward withdrawal from the League of Nations. It is throughout actively anti-communist, anti-liberal and anti-Christian.[9]

The repercussions of Japan's Manchurian actions, however, have served as an excellent stimulus to the militarists, not only in Japan but almost everywhere else. More than thirty years ago the first courageous moves were made in the effort that was continued up to the present to find some other code than that of the gunboat by means of which international disagreements in the Far East and elsewhere might be settled. The Boxer Rebellion in 1900 came to China at a time when the old manner of doing things—in which, then, Japan was taking an intensive course—had not been seriously questioned. The situation arising from this threat to the foreigners in China was too good a chance for the Powers to pass up. They forthwith laid plans for that nation's partition. But America's Secretary of State, John Hay, backed by the square-jawed tactics of Theodore Roosevelt, wrecked the scheme. Together they made it plain first that China's channels of trade would be kept open to all comers (the Open Door Policy); and, second, that China's territory would be kept for China.

The imperialistically-minded statesmen of the Powers and their military compatriots smiled up their sleeves but endorsed this radical departure from the conventional manner of doing international business, not because they believed in it but because they were not in a position to challenge it successfully. These policies were in the main observed for the next twenty years and finally, at the Washington Conference in 1921, they were put down in black and white, signed, sealed and formally ratified in the Nine Power Pact. This pact declares:

> The contracting Powers, other than China, agree:
> To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
> To provide the fullest and the most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

[9] The article above referred to in the *Christian Century* deals with this movement and, more recently, the New York *Herald Tribune* has published an illuminating series of articles on the subject by Wilfrid Fleisher, its Tokio correspondent.

Japan signed this pact with eight other interested nations and a policy that already had two decades of precedent was officially established as permanent and binding. Earlier than this other, similar efforts had been made to discover some substitute for the ancient agency of force between nations. Out of these efforts came the League of Nations, the Covenant of which declares in Article X:

> The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Japan, along with fifty-three other nations is a member of the League, and, ostensibly, is bound by the League Covenant.

Likewise, the desire to set up some alternatives to international force led, in 1928, to the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war, which declares in part two that

> The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.

This, too, was ratified by Japan along with fifty-three other nations, including the United States and Russia.

From the very beginning, at the opening of this century, down to the present the full force of the militarists of the world has been directed against these efforts to devise some substitute for war. And the militarists, up to the World War, had their way. Since 1918, however, the movement for peace has received unprecedented sanction from the public opinion of the world and, as a result, the military counselors who largely dominated pre-war diplomacy have been forced increasingly into the background. There, with somewhat limited facilities, they have carried on their propaganda and awaited developments. Sooner or later, as they well knew, events would develop which, astutely used, might afford means for tearing down or hopelessly discrediting the peace machinery.

The big chance came when the Japanese occupied Manchuria and, in defiance of a whole sheaf of pre-war and post-war pledges, waged a war from the safety of Shanghai's International Settlement on the Chinese. And thus, Japan's militarists, out to help themselves, helped the militarists of all nations by demonstrating that the old game was not up yet.

These violations of the peace commitments were serious enough in Manchuria, but they were much more serious in regard to the bombardment of Shanghai. Here a defenseless city was destroyed in precisely the manner and with precisely the results that the enlightened opinion of the world had been seeking to outlaw. The rather general sympathy felt toward the Japanese in regard to Manchuria was quickly turned to antagonism by the blunder at Shanghai. But the extent to which the

Japanese "got away with it" was, at the same time, just that much more fuel for the rising flames of world militarism.

Now, however openly the various anti-war treaties were violated by the Japanese, I do not for a moment believe that the peace machinery —meaning specifically the League of Nations—has been either partially destroyed or in the slightest degree permanently discredited. What the League failed to do, in this recent crisis, was so eloquently dwelt upon by both militarists and perfectionists that what the League actually accomplished—through the continuance of negotiations, the mobilization of world opinion and, finally, in actually restraining Japan—has been too generally overlooked. In the eyes of most unprejudiced observers, the League in this situation proved, as it had not had opportunity to prove before, its international indispensability.

But that is a close-up of the situation, so far as the future is concerned. What Japan did do was, first, to give comfort and renewed hope to the military party in every nation and, second, to establish a *fait accompli* which, if maintained, will bring the peace machinery into peril. An even casual following of the jingo press of the United States made it plain that henceforth Manchuria and Shanghai would be the two classical illustrations of those who insist that no substitutes for war can be discovered. The big navy advocates in the American Congress were encouraged to press for appropriations which, a year before, would never have been proposed. The resolutions of American adherence to the World Court, which in the previous session of Congress appeared to have sufficient votes to insure passage, were placed in jeopardy. Militaristic organizations that had become relatively quiescent waxed vociferous again. Black lists were pulled from their files and put into circulation. Enrollment in the Citizens' Military Training Camps, for which considerable drumming up had previously been necessary, jumped to record proportions. Japan's aggression, in other words, slowed down the movement for peace and speeded up the lagging forces of militarism.

It is of great significance, however, that the one group of Japanese who have refused, most consistently, either to compromise or to be silent is the Christian. The present crisis has proved, if nothing else, that the militaristic appraisal of Christianity is correct. The patriotic propaganda by which the militarists hoped to stir, again, the unreasoning fervor of the people was an unqualified, popular success save with a certain liberal group and with the Christians. It was not that the liberals and the Christians were less patriotic than their fellow-Japanese, but only that they were less ready to accept the doctrine that whatever is accomplished by force of arms deserves to be supported and were less afraid to say so.

Kagawa, of course, is the most widely known representative of this group, although there are others of great influence like Nitobe, Tagawa,

Ebizawa and Nagao. Kagawa has recognized the justice of Japan's contentions in regard to Manchuria and the indispensability of Manchuria for Japan's economic welfare and her political security. But, also like many of his fellow-Christians, he has stood uncompromisingly against a final reliance upon force as the means to win these things.

The *World Tomorrow* in its issue of April, 1932, prints a full page of poems by Kagawa on the Far Eastern Crisis. A footnote indicates, significantly, that these poems were first of all printed in Japan and since the seizure of Mukden. The lines reprinted here are adequate proof of the significant asset for peace that Christianity has provided:

> Again I have become the child of an aching heart,
> Carrying the burden of Japan's crime,
> Begging pardon of China and of the world,
> With a shattered soul;
> I have become a child of sadness.
>
> I dream of the day of the Union of Asia—
> Flags of China, Russia, India and Japan floating high,
> And all Asiatic nations becoming sources of blessing,
> Supplying each others' needs,
> Helping and loving one another.
> Let us bring in the rejoicing of Asia!
> Is it not our mission?

But Kagawa, as I have already indicated, is the voice of many other more obscure but no less uncompromising liberals and Christians. A Japan missionary a few days ago received a letter from a Christian Japanese mother which, according to the missionary, reflects a point of view that is widespread.

"My two children", she writes, "are greatly concerned and are fearfully troubled over it (the war). As soon as they awaken in the morning they rush for the paper to see if the fighting has not ceased. The Chinese and Japanese are brothers, I can't bear to think of either of them suffering or being slain. I only pray for their reconciliation".

Letters recently received from other Christian Japanese indicate the same spirit. Here is one of many such declarations:

"There is a liberal, a Christian group that cannot be ignored. It is not large and it has its hands full: fighting for temperance, for the abolition of legalized vice and for the emancipation of women, for actual freedom of religious worship and fighting all the evils of modern Western civilization. It is not limited to the Christian Church, yet it draws much of its strength there. The Christians in the churches are the victims of propaganda like other people and yet they are praying for peace. . . . I see no more definite contribution to peace in Japan and the Orient than in the strengthening of the Christian schools and the Christian churches."

But there is even more significant evidence of the Christian position in this crisis. Early in 1932, a wealthy Japanese Christian declared that the Shanghai hostilities—then at their worst—were a challenge to the

Christians of both nations. He proposed to do something about it. He did. Out of his own pocket he financed a Christian good-will delegation to Shanghai. As if an American Christian, after Belleau Wood, had tried to finance a good-will delegation to Germany! That delegation—consisting of four Japanese and five Japan missionaries arrived, under the shadow of Japan's guns, in the Chinese city early in March. Their purposes were threefold: "To find an opportunity to get in touch with the Chinese Christian leaders; to express our deepest sympathy and try to remove any misunderstanding in our fellowship in Christ; to establish fellowship with the resident missionaries for cooperation and reconciliation".

These purposes were accomplished. The report of one of the members of the delegation declares that, in addressing a dinner given by the Chinese Christians, he "tried to express our deepest sympathy for the tragedy and that we feel the responsibility before God and that we are convinced that until the Prince of Peace stands between the two countries there will not come the Kingdom of God in the Orient; that as the monument of Christ was erected on the border line of Chile and the Argentine to commemorate the peace established between those two countries, we should strive to join hands in fellowship centering in Christ, for we are bound together by ties that nothing can break".

This speech, it should be remembered, was made while Japanese and Chinese armies were still glowering at one another in the trenches near Shanghai. The Chinese Christians who replied with a like declaration of faith had come that day from a tour of the ruins of Chapei. Their hearts were burdened with the suffering of their own people at the hands of the Japanese militarists. And yet here was common ground on which both Japanese and Chinese could stand with understanding and fellowship. It is doubtful if the four years of the World War produced any such dramatic proof of fearless devotion to a gospel that cannot be bound by battle lines. As one non-missionary observer declared: "In this demonstration there are more hopes for peace than in all the economic and political panaceas that wise men can devise; and more proof of the importance of Christianity than a library of missionary volumes and a year of missionary addresses could provide".

Meanwhile, of course, the Christians of Japan are not making Japan policies. The immediate problem is to check, by whatever means are available, that rising tide of militarism which at some future time Christianity, if it continues to grow in strength, will be able to stem. If, now, what Japan has accomplished by military methods is allowed to stand, then of course the situation just ahead will become more serious. Adequate precedent will have been established for any nation, strong enough to do so, to disregard its peace commitments and appropriate, in time honored fashion, what it can get its hands on. The world in such a case will be back where it was in 1914. The only dependable

international law will be that of force and the only dependable international restraint will be that of superior force. Japan's actions have brought to a critical focus the fundamental issue of war and peace. The Japanese, opening a way for themselves into Manchuria, have opened a way for the world back into anarchy. Our stake in a final, just settlement of the situation in Eastern Asia is as great as our belief that order is more profitable than chaos; that good-will is better business than hate; and that civilization, for the present at least, can ill afford the costs of another major conflict.

II

PERHAPS, in the long run, the bitterest fruit of this aggression will be reaped in China. Japan has done, for the mind of China, what Germany in 1870 did for the mind of France. Manchuria and Shanghai provide not only a platform for Chinese unity: they provide, as well, a program for a united China. The platform is adequate. But the program is ominous.

Some months before the Japanese entered upon their Manchurian campaign General Chiang Kai-shek, then the President of China, came from his capital at Nanking to Shanghai in order to launch two Chinese Yangtze River gunboats. As modern fighting craft go, these boats did not bulk large. In most of the nations of the West the launching of such insignificant vessels would have been left to the mayor of the nearest city or, at the most, to some retired Rear-Admiral. General Chiang, doubtless, was aware that, by Western standards, he was making a big stir about an insignificant matter. At any rate, in the speech which he delivered he made it plain that he had come to Shanghai not because these boats were important in themselves, but because they were important for what they portended. They were, he said, symbolic of the fact that China was in process of uniting; that, during the process, she had learned many lessons and that, of these, perhaps the one of foremost importance was the necessity for the development of her military resources. These gunboats, General Chiang declared, were indicative of the fact that China, one of these days, proposed to have a navy that would be able to win for her an undisputed status, not only in the waters of Eastern Asia but on any of the earth's seven seas.

That, obviously, was good patriotic talk. The boats slipped into the water, the President of China returned to Nanking and none of the statesmen of the Powers were stirred by the event into anything more than a smirk. Months later, Japan had put Manchuria under her military heel and bombarded Chapei into ruins. The Nineteenth Route Army of Cantonese had given to the world an unexpected demonstration of fighting qualities of the Chinese soldier. The nationalists of Canton and Shanghai and Nanking—of all the chief cities of the coun-

try—were in a fever of patriotic enthusiasm. Not before in modern times had the national atmosphere been so electric. And not before in modern times had so many Chinese in so many widely separated places appeared to be so strongly of one mind. In the midst of that situation, young T. V. Soong—a graduate of the Harvard School of Business Administration, Finance Minister in the Nanking government and said by many observers to be China's wisest statesman—made a public declaration.

China, he said, had been taught a vastly important lesson by the bombs and bayonets of the Japanese. That lesson indicated, first, the necessity for national unity and, second, the immediate development of the nation's military strength. To the accomplishment of those two ends, the Chinese people would, with increasing determination, devote themselves.

That declaration was not laughed out of court. The newspapers of the West carried it. Editorials gave it interpretive attention. There were a few official comments by those in authority and much unofficial discussion of just what Soong had meant. As a matter of fact, no one seriously doubted what he meant. But the significant additional fact was that many people no longer doubted the ability of the Chinese to do what he declared they intended. For in the winter of 1931-1932, it was discovered that, with all allowances for chaos, confusion and misgovernment, the world had a new China on its hands. And with that discovery a second followed, namely, that the emergence of a strong, united, and determined China would constitute a force, for good or ill, potent enough to upset, if not to wreck, the international scheme of things. In short, China, nationally speaking has begun to make up her mind. And when 440,000,000 people make up their mind about anything that is too important a fact, in our kind of world, to be ignored, and whatever they make up their mind about becomes too significant to be escaped.

Now it is significant that precisely the same forces which operated to shake Japan out of its mediaeval lethargy and into her modern nationalistic and military temper are operating to the same end in China. The results of the process, of course, will come more slowly. China is today a nation some fifteen times more populous than the Japan that opened its doors to Admiral Perry and his gunboats. This huge population is spread over an area more than twenty-six times that of Japan proper. The ancient feudatory and military traditions of Japan prepared the people to fit with relative ease into the predatory international system that was maintained in the nineteenth century. China has been without such a forceful tradition. The soldier stood at the top of the social scale of ancient Japan. He stood at the bottom of the social scale in China. Moreover, Japan benefited by the centralized authority of the Shogunate. The Shoguns not only issued decrees. They saw to their enforcement. China, for centuries, has had no

such strong central government. Decrees might be issued. But there was no authority to see to their effective enforcement beyond the boundaries of the national and provincial capitals. For these reasons, the lessons which Japan learned one day and acted upon the next are more slowly absorbed and put into practice by the Chinese. But that they are being absorbed and that one day they will be practiced is, I think, undeniable.

The new China which even now is emerging is not, of course, a product of Japan's recent aggressions. Japan merely speeded up a movement which has been under way ever since the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The defeat of China by Japan in 1894 had many results in China, the most significant of which, unquestionably, was the conversion of a young Chinese physician, Sun Yat Sen by name, into an active revolutionist. His immediate aim was to overthrow the Manchus and set up a democratic government. When, in 1911, the Manchus were overthrown Dr. Sun became the first President of the Chinese Republic, an office which he surrendered later to Yuan Shih-kai in order to bring about the union of north and south China.

This union was never effectively secured or for long maintained. In fact, the establishment of the Republic increased, rather than lessened, the confusion from which the country was suffering. Ever since Yuan Shih-kai sought to make himself emperor, his generals or their successors have kept up an almost constant warfare between themselves and at the expense of the country. As recently as 1928, T. V. Soong declared that the Chinese people at that time were being forced to maintain more than 2,000,000 soldiers at a cash outlay of at least $360,000,000 annually, and some estimates have placed the figure at $800,000,000. This huge sum is collected, frequently, by direct levies upon the already over-burdened people. And when no money is collected the soldiers, customarily, undertake collections on their own account. This constant warfare and the attendant chaos have saddled China not only with soldiers but with vast numbers of bandits. It is said that the province of Honan alone contains some 400,000 bandits and the one city of Iyang in 1930 passed from the control of one bandit gang to another some seventy times.[10] Hand in hand with warfare and banditry go widespread bribery and corruption. And under the shelter of the prevailing confusion the production of opium—almost stamped out between 1906 and 1913—has again assumed alarming proportions.

When, therefore, the Japanese look upon the government of Nanking as a government in name only and when they insist that no such political entity as China exists at all they base their contentions on the all too apparent strife and disunity which now, as for twenty years, have widely characterized conditions throughout the country.

This contention that there is no China, in the political sense, cannot, despite these conditions, be taken seriously. For twenty years Japan has

[10] Eddy, *The Challenge of the East*, p. 73.

done business with China on precisely the same assumption as the rest of the world, namely, that there was such a political entity. She has maintained diplomatic relations with this entity, carried on negotiations, discussed and settled the conventional matters that customarily arise between nations. Disorganized and confused China certainly has been. But there is nothing in the history of Japan's Chinese relations to indicate that this "discovery" that there is no China, politically speaking, is anything more than an invention devised for explanatory purposes.

It is a contention, moreover, which was effectively answered by Secretary of State Stimson's historic letter to Senator Borah. The American policy therein outlined may come, one day, to stand in importance with the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy. For the American Secretary of State made it plain that the United States would never recognize any territorial changes, anywhere, which were brought about in violation of the terms of the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Treaty. In other words, the United States went beyond the mere outlawry of war for itself, to the outlawry of the fruits of war for any other nation. And the assembly of the League of Nations, in a meeting of extraordinary importance on March 11, 1932, put the full weight of the League's machinery behind this new doctrine. Back of these declarations was a frank recognition of the fact that China was still far from stabilized and an equally frank assertion that it was the business of the Powers to see to it that that stabilization, already in process, be carried on with the encouragement and without the interference of other nations. China, the world agreed, is a nation: and, more than that, a nation that must be defended in its right to work out its own salvation and to increase the strength of its nationhood.

But by no means the whole or the most significant account of today's China can be told in terms of banditry, civil war and impotent governments. The first revolution—that of 1911—succeeded in the overthrow of the Manchus. But it failed in most of its other objectives. In 1925, a second revolution was begun, this also under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. This second revolution called for the reconstruction of China through three stages: first, military preparation; second, educational preparation; third, political preparation. These objectives are not likely to be lost.

Between the years of 1911 and 1925 certain hopeful forces had begun to work. For one thing there was the Student Movement of 1919. In that year, the Versailles Conference had virtually awarded Shantung Province to the Japanese. The Chinese government was too impotent to make effective protest. But China's students, however impotent, did protest. And their protests eventually were made potent. It was from these protests that the 1920 boycott of Japan was undertaken. That boycott was amazingly effective. Japan's trade with China

dropped sixty percent in sixty days. Japanese residents of China's cities —unable to buy food from the Chinese—were obliged either to import it or to starve. The boycott, aided by other factors, achieved its purpose and Shantung Province was returned at the time of the Washington Conference in 1921. But much more than the return of Shantung was accomplished. China's students who had gone on the warpath against Japan, had preached up and down the nation the new patriotism. This program of political and nationalistic education, begun in 1919, has been continued up to the present time. Today, as a result, there is a more definite national consciousness in China than at any time in many decades.

This developing national consciousness was given further stimulus when, in 1926, the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Army, pledging itself to the purposes of Dr. Sun, began its triumphal march from Canton into the Yangtze Valley. The advance of this army was as much an education as a military victory. Posters and market-place oratory played fully as large a part in its success as superior battle strategy. From a military viewpoint, war-lords were being subdued, but from the viewpoint of nationalism people were being trained. Eventually, this conquest was extended, not only through the Yangtze Valley but north to Peking—not, however, until after General Chiang Kai-shek, commander of the forces in the field had ousted the communists who, invited in by Dr. Sun as advisers, had turned out to be dictators. Following this victory, the capital was moved from Peking to the more centrally located Nanking and here the nationalists—with General Chiang as President—set up the national government. And this regime, unable as it has been to control the whole nation or even to carry with it the left wing of the Kuomintang party, has nonetheless given to China not only a more constructive but also a more united government than any it has had since the early days of the Republic. Moreover, for the first time in many years a national government has been able to command the support and cooperation of a majority of the best trained and the soundest of the nation's leaders.

Along with these political developments there were others that cannot be left out of account. What the Japanese achieved in quick fashion and by edict, the Chinese have been obliged to attempt more slowly and by educational processes. It is this necessity which in 1917 gave rise to the Renaissance Movement. By it, the youth of China are seeking to bring the nation into the life of the modern world, with as much of ancient China retained as is of value and as much of the new West grafted on as may appear to be significant. A new written language, designed to reach the man in the street, has been devised. Sixty years ago there was one newspaper—the oldest in the world—in China. Today, in the new popular language, there are several hundred newspapers and more than twelve hundred registered periodicals. The average Chinese can now read the language which he speaks.

That is, he can read if he is fortunate enough to have learned. Between 80 and 90 per cent of the Chinese people are illiterate. That fact remained a major obstacle in the path of the new China. It was with that in mind that James Yen, a Yale graduate, organized the Mass Education Movement by which children and adults can be taught to read with a few weeks of part-time study. Already a remarkable number, young and old, have been reached. More than 3,000,000 books of the movement are in circulation. The first course, in the rudiments of education, is customarily followed with a course in citizenship training.

Moreover, in China, as in Japan, it is impossible to leave out of account the leavening influence of Christianity. This influence is felt in a number of indirect ways as well as through the direct work of evangelism. A variety of factors are at work to bring the new China into being. There are many who believe that of these Christianity is the most powerful. This, at any rate, is the testimony of some of those who are most opposed to foreign missions. Lord Inchcape, British shipping magnate, places the responsibility for the rise of a less docile, less easily exploited spirit among the peoples of the East squarely upon the Christian missionary. Rodney Gilbert and other Westerners, solicitous for our trade rather than for the Chinese, share the same point of view. Nathaniel Peffer, no friend of missions, declares that "in so far as the missionary successfully preached Christianity, he struck at foreign domination". In short, it seems to be the consensus of opinion that China could not, for long, have had Christianity and continued content with the injustices of foreign domination. Every mission school and every Bible study class became an agency for the increase of Chinese self-respect. Small wonder that the exploiters with one accord pointed out that Christianity spoiled the Chinese. It did spoil them—for all manner of exploitation and slavery—by attempting to fit them to be sons of God. It was no mere happenstance that Sun Yat Sen was a Christian or that in the recent nationalist government five out of thirteen cabinet members were Christians, although Christianity numbers only a small fraction out of China's millions.

It is against the background of these developments that one must view the present situation in China. The heroic devotion of the Nineteenth Route Army at Shanghai was only a dramatic and military expression of a nationalistic spirit that is rapidly increasing in intensity and in extent throughout all China. Just how that spirit can find other expression was illustrated in the 1931 boycott of Japan. The Japanese have insisted that there is no national government in China. And yet while they insist upon the impotence of the Nanking regime, they credit it with strength sufficient to enforce, throughout China, a boycott of Japanese goods which cut off eighty per cent of Japan's trade with the Chinese and put a considerable number of Japanese firms in China entirely out of business.

Obviously, no undertaking so fully dependent upon popular support and so easily capable of evasion could have succeeded to this extent without either the strong hand of a strong government, the intense devotion of an intensely nationalistic people or with a combination of the two. With little doubt, in this case, the success of the boycott was due, for the most part, to the aroused national consciousness of the Chinese people. When Japan's marines marched into Chapei, ostensibly to break it, they were giving testimony to the fact that China's new nationalism had become a force to reckon with. And when, against this background T. V. Soong declares that the Chinese have learned, at last, that if they expect help they must become strong enough to help themselves, the world understands that his statement is more than a patriotic boast.

The peril of this situation, obviously, lies in the fact that China had counted for her security upon the peace machinery of this post-war world. Japan apparently has been allowed to disregard that machinery and to take what she wanted in the old manner. The issue, so far as the world is concerned, does not rest in the question as to whether Japan's accusations against China are true, but, whether true or false, Japan is justified in the method she has chosen to secure settlement. It is not a question as to whether Japan is justified in taking *some* action in Manchuria or at Shanghai. It is a question as to whether she is justified in taking *this* action. There was a time, of course, when Japan's present methods were the only available ones. But Japan, along with the rest of the world, is party to the pacts and processes by which those methods are outlawed and new methods agreed to. If, for the furthering of their own interests in China, the Japanese are permitted to disregard this new international order then it will be China's inevitable conclusion that other nations can follow that precedent and that the peace machinery provides an altogether too uncertain guarantee for China's integrity.

Dr. W. W. Yen, China's chief delegate at the League of Nations, in an introduction to "China Speaks" states the case very clearly. After referring to the efforts of the last twelve years to build up the structure of world peace he writes:

> All these things together make up what we may call the new order in the affairs of nations. Will this new order gather to itself strength and survive; or is it destined to find disaster on the rocks of human selfishness, greed and materialism? The Sino-Japanese controversy is the first great test. The old order is here pitted against the new. Japan, though a participant in all of the measures taken to build up the modern system of right, has chosen the ancient method of might to settle her dispute with China. Japan's appeal to arms is a direct challenge to the new order. China, on the other hand, rests her cause squarely on the foundations which have been so carefully laid for the peaceful adjustment of all international differences.

In regard to that last sentence, the skeptic will observe, doubtless, that that is the only place where China can rest her cause. That, for the

short view of things, may be true. But in the long run if the peace machinery does not provide security and justice for China, the Chinese can be counted upon to find machinery of some other sort.

Up to the present, I believe China's belief in the new international order has been genuine. Credit for this, as in the case of the peace sentiment in Japan, must largely go to the influence of Christianity. The missionaries have provided the chief evidence available to the Chinese people that not all of Western civilization was a matter of gunboats and gain. If there is among China's nationalists a still vital belief that the West will stand for fair play in regard to China, that belief is largely a product of Christian missions. And, as the *Manchester Guardian* puts it, "We shall not win to a better understanding by withdrawing the one class of Europeans who are living in China not to get but to give".

China, as we have pointed out, is already going nationalist. It remains to be determined whether or not she will also go militarist. If the former development is allowed to lead to the latter then, certainly, world peace can only be built on the flimsiest foundation. Here are 440,000,000 people, living in an area that contains perhaps more of the world's unexploited resources—particularly its war resources—than any other. The world has just been given, at Shanghai, proof of the fighting qualities of the Chinese soldiers. These qualities have been recognized by military observers ever since the days of "Chinese" Gordon and the Tai Ping Rebellion. There is little doubt that the Chinese, if they are not able to secure justice by peaceful means, will one day be strong enough to get it by force. And a China, strong enough to fight for justice, will probably be too strong and too thoroughly militarized to be content when that justice—which would be acceptable today—is finally won. Militarism breeds ambitions of the sort that are not that easily satisfied.

The issue of whether China, going nationalist, will also go militarist is largely in the hands, right now, of the Christians of China jointly with the Christians of the world. There are many evangelical arguments for the strengthening of Christianity in China. But there are other arguments which are founded on international common sense. If China is forced into militarism it will be because either the so-called Christian nations of the West have not been Christian enough to secure fairness for her, or, the Christians of China, weakened by the weakening missionary activity, have not been able to stem the rapidly mounting tide of nationalist extremism.

III

OF ALL the factors in the Far Eastern situation certainly the most uncertain and, in some respects the most potent, is Soviet Russia. The recent Russo-Japanese clashes along the Siberian frontier, the mobiliza-

tion of Soviet troops at strategic points near the Manchurian border, the exchange of caustic notes between the two nations, these, in the opinion of many observers, are but the first insignificant clashes in what, one day, is due to be a major conflict.

Russia's interest in Manchuria goes back to the time of Peter the Great, whose ambition it was to put Russia on the high seas. The accomplishment of this ambition required ice-free ports. There were three ways for Russia to ice-free waters and of these British authority dominated two: the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. There remained the long route through Manchuria to the Yellow Sea. This long route Russia travelled, building in the Trans-Siberian Railway the longest land line in the world. The eastern terminus of this road was Vladivostock—a port that is frozen shut during several months of the winter.

This difficulty was met, however, when, by dubious means Russia secured from China the right to build a short cut to Vladivostock across Northern Manchuria—now the Chinese Eastern Railway—and to build, also, a southern extension of the same road—now the South Manchurian Railway—to the ice-free port of Talienwan. At this port, which was renamed Dalny, the Russians had won their ice-free access to the sea. The victory, as we have seen, was short-lived. Japan, after the war of 1904 and 1905, took over the fruits of Russia's expansion in Manchuria, changed the name of Dalny to Dairen and continued the expansion which Russia had begun.

Subsequent agreements between Russia and Japan, however, recognized that Russia, despite the defeat of 1904-1905, had certain special rights in Northern Manchuria, due to her control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It has since been recognized that Northern Manchuria was, ostensibly, a Russian "sphere of influence". Theoretically, however, the Japanese, in the "independent" state which they have now set up at Changchun, control the whole of the three provinces from the Great Wall to the Amur River. Russian management of the Chinese Eastern Railway has not been interfered with, but both that interest and other "rights" which Russia has claimed in Northern Manchuria are almost certain to come into conflict with the tightening grip of the new Japan-sponsored government.

Moreover, there are other sources of irritation between Russia and Japan. For a number of years an acrimonious dispute has continued relative to Japan's fishing rights in the Sea of Japan off Vladivostock. The treaty by which Russia has extended these privileges expires in the near future and there is a likelihood that it will not be extended. Moreover, for a decade Japan at home has been disturbed by persistent communist propaganda which has invaded the nation's universities and found a fertile field in the labor movement. And, perhaps most serious of all, the militarists of Japan have seen in Russia's bid for power in China and her alleged propagandist efforts in Korea a direct threat to

Japan's security in the latter land and her ambitions regarding the former.

It is, in fact, as a communist rather than as an imperialist nation that Soviet Russia enters the Far Eastern picture most significantly. It was in China, in the years from 1925 to 1927, that Soviet Russia played for her highest international stakes. The game, for the time being, was lost when General Chiang Kai-shek turned against the Russian wing of the Kuomintang party, ousted it and outlawed its communist spokesmen. But patriotic Chinese have not forgotten that it was through communist aid that the Kuomintang party—and with it the nationalist movement—was rehabilitated and its subsequent conquests made possible. And observers of things Chinese have never for a moment believed that Russian ambitions in China, temporarily thwarted, have been abandoned.

The Chinese nationalists, through Dr. Sun Yat Sen, turned to Russia for help in 1925, not because they were communists but because no other help was forthcoming. It seems generally agreed that China, if no other help appears, is likely to turn toward Russia again, as an aftermath of the present crisis. And there are few to deny that such help would be enthusiastically extended.

In fact, the situation in Eastern Asia is made to order for the communists. Communist propaganda thrives on unrest and in the midst of injustices. The communist propagandist has learned how to identify himself with the people whom he is seeking to convert, to talk their language, share their indignations and their sufferings, and fit his gospel to their peculiar needs. It is probably only a preoccupation with difficult economic problems at home that, up to now, has kept the party from undertaking an aggressive propagandist offensive in the Far East. Here, for example, are twenty million Koreans—irked and irritated by Japanese rule. In Manchuria there are nearly thirty million Chinese, just handed over, en masse, to the unwelcome domination of Japan. In China, there is a vast population whose nationalist leaders are at the business of arousing the people against wrongs which, without outside help, the nation will not soon be able to set right. Already there is a persistent and increasing clamor in China's nationalist ranks for a Soviet alliance. If the League of Nations Commission and the diplomatic intervention of the United States are unable to bring about definite, and now apparently impossible, steps toward adjustment, this demand for a return of the Soviets will probably be successful.

The fact remains that, whether for good motives or for bad, the Soviets, ever since the days of Karakhan at Peking shortly after the Russian Revolution, have posed as the friends of the Chinese. Moreover, the friendship has been more than a pose. The Soviets, early in their dealings with China, renounced the privilege of extraterritoriality under which most other Westerners live in China and, from the beginning, dealt with the Chinese not as a superior power but as an equal. And

in the rehabilitation of the Kuomintang party, itself, they made a practical contribution to nationalist China which no other nation can match.

Despite the preoccupation with the Five Year Plans, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Soviets propose, permanently, to abandon their missionary program. One of these days, economic and political security at home having been won, the communists are certain to look abroad, again, for new fields to conquer. Whereas, in the early days of the Revolution, it was a sovietized Europe that filled the dreams of the Soviets, latterly it has been a sovietized Asia. More specifically, it has been a sovietized Eastern Asia.

Significantly, the practical experiences of the Five Year Plans are certain to prove of more value as preparation for a Far Eastern than an Occidental advance. The Soviets, taking over the job of organizing China, would have an undertaking on their hands that would be quantitatively larger, but qualitatively very little different from that which they are meeting in Russia. China, like Russia, is largely agricultural. Her people suffer from the same agricultural conservatisms that prevail among the Russians. The nation possesses very much the same type of resources, and suffers in very much the same way from their undevelopment. And the life of the Chinese peasant, like the Russian, is burdened with precisely those problems that can most readily be capitalized for communist propagandist purposes. To cap it all, there is in China a persistent, aggressive Left Wing which insists, in season and out, that national salvation will come in no other way save via Soviet Russia.

In this particular, again, it is Christianity that stands as the strongest bulwark against the communist advance into China. The communists themselves provide the best proof of this fact. An anti-Christian campaign has been the inevitable first step in communist activity, anywhere in China. The communists have been at great pains to identify the missionaries and the Christian message with Western exploitation and the whole scheme of injustices from which the new China desires to be freed. This, of course, is sound tactics. For the conflict here is between two diametrically opposing ways of life. The Christian, like the communist, has identified himself with the needs and the aspirations of the Chinese people. He, like the communist, has offered them a panacea for their ills. And, like the communist, he has insisted that there is no other way, under heaven, whereby either personal or national salvation can be secured. The Christian, however, has preached reliance upon love and good-will. The communist's reliance is upon individual hatred and organized conflict. And the communist, more readily than the Christian, has recognized that, in the end, the issue in China will be fought out between these two forces. Victory for one means, inevitably, defeat for the other.

It has been sound sense for the communist, therefore, to direct his

hostility, first and foremost, against the Christian missionary. With the missionary and his gospel out of the way in China—as in most other mission fields—the Soviet propagandists would have relatively clear sailing. Communists recognize this fact, even though Christians—as indicated by their lapsing interest in foreign missions—have failed to do so.

The day is right now at hand when Christians, if they still profess commitment to the world significance of their faith, will be obliged to support that position with more aggressive action. Some of the fervor that characterizes the communist in regard to his missionary enterprise might well be recaptured by the Christian. The communist will encompass the earth to make one proselyte. Christians, though still eager for converts to their faith, too frequently count the cost and thereafter reduce their effort. There can be no safe reduction of the Christian effort in today's kind of world. Every retreating step that Christianity takes leaves an opening for some of these less-than-Christian forces to move forward. And they are moving forward. Involved in their forward movement is not only the material but, infinitely more important, the spiritual mastery of the non-white world.

CONCLUSION

A NEW YORK business man, who more recently has gone in for farming on an extensive scale, attended a few days ago a discussion of the Far Eastern situation. This discussion brought out in some detail the point which I have tried to emphasize in this pamphlet. At the end of the evening, riding home with the discussion leader, the business man gave what, to him, seemed the nub of the arguments.

"I've bought several farms", he said, "and I've been hoping that my boys would go in for agriculture. I'm giving them a good enough education and I'll set them up when they are through school. But tonight that program looks a bit uncertain. In fact, it strikes me that unless we can get this Far Eastern matter settled right, it won't make much difference what I plan for my boys. Neither my bank account nor their farms will amount to much with China militarized or communized and on a rampage".

He rode on a few minutes in silence.

"You know," he said, "I've never taken much stock in foreign missions. But it looks to me now as though I've got a stake in that enterprise that will stand a little investment".

It's hard to see how anyone can look, even for an evening, into the Far Eastern situation and come out without some such conclusion. The issue in the Far East is not between temporary economic and political programs, but between opposing life purposes. The people of Eastern Asia, at the present moment, are engaged in much more than an eco-

nomic or political struggle. They are engaged in the disturbing process of making up their minds what gods they propose to serve. Spokesmen for the gods of Militarism and Nationalism and Communism are preaching their faith, with increasing insistence, at every Far Eastern crossroads. And the Christian gospel, too, is being preached, with equal insistence but with lessening support. One of these days the decision, now pending, will be made. In that decision, not Asia only but the whole world will be involved. We do not have it within our power to prevent the making of this choice. We have it within our power to make it more certain than it now appears to be that that choice will be Christian.

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The author acknowledges indebtedness for the use of material contained in two significant volumes by Grover Clark which at the time of this writing had not come from the press. They are "A Study of Economic Rivalries in China," and "Manchuria: A Survey of Its Economic Development."

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